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Forcing the Issue: An Analysis of the
Various Standards of Forcible
Compulsion in Rape'
Late at night, a woman is walking briskly through her college campus
in the North End of Philadelphia. She hears the same ominous noises
that one often hears in that particular area of the city at that time of
night. She attempts to unlock the door of her apartment, and her worst
nightmare materializes when she is surprised by the intrusion of an
assailant. He tells her to take her clothes off. She is surprised, afraid,
and unsure of what to do. In only a few precious seconds, she has to
make a potentially life or death decision. He has made no threat, but
she is afraid of what may happen if she does not obey. Reluctantly, she
complies, out of fear. She does not verbally or physically resist his
penetration, and the two have intercourse.
The woman files a complaint alleging rape. Intuition tells her that her
"consent" to intercourse will surely be found to have been vitiated by
the coercive circumstances surrounding the event. She also realizes that
the slightest penetration is enough to constitute rape.' There's one
slight problem, however, as the prosecutor informs her that they must
prove that the defendant "forcibly" had unlawful intercourse with her.
Further, her fear of bodily injury is admissible to show lack of consent,
but not to show force. The prosecutor explains that had she resisted, at
least some evidence would exist to prove force. She is confused. Was
1. The author would like to thank his mother, Eleanor R. Fried, Ph.D., for her
clinical and professional insight in helping to develop this topic and for her constant
and unwavering support throughout law school.
2. See State v. Mackor, 527 A.2d 710, 713 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (stating that
"[plenetration, however slight" is sufficient to constitute intercourse); People v. Fryer,
618 N.E.2d 377 (Ill. 1993) (reasoning that the slightest penetration constitutes criminal
sexual assault); State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261, 1271 (Kan. 1994) (noting that the
state may establish the element of penetration solely by demonstrating penetration of
the vulva or labia-penetration of the vagina is not required); State v. Wright, 598 So.
2d 561 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (reasoning that the slightest penetration will suffice-emis-
sion is not required); Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 646 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1994) (stating that the slightest penetration sufficiently constituted involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse); Nilsson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972) (holding that penetration may be proven by circumstantial evidence).
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not the prudent procedure in this type of scenario not to resist? Yet
without resistance, she cannot prove force.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rape is a difficult subject to address from a scholarly perspective
because of the emotional issues that accompany the subject. The major-
ity of articles that have dealt with rape have focused on the issue of
consent, specifically whether states should adopt a standard whereby a
woman could verbally communicate her desire to engage or not to
engage in intercourse.' The element of force, however, and the role
that it has in the context of a rape is less commonly addressed.
Three recent state supreme court cases have addressed the element
of force, its function in convicting a defendant of rape, and represent
the three general categories of force.4 Each case represents both a dif-
ferent approach to the force element and to what degree and through
which mechanisms the prosecution must show force in order to obtain
a rape conviction. In People v. Iniguez,5 the California Supreme Court
held that the prosecution may use evidence of immediate fear of bodily
injury to prove the force element.' One week later, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz7 that the victim's
verbal protestations were irrelevant to the issue of whether the defen-
dant forcibly raped the victim.' Finally, in State ex rel. M.T.S.,' the
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the act of penetration contained
the requisite amount of force necessary to prove rape, essentially re-
moving the element of force from the rape analysis.' °
3. Rape reform is a rapidly evolving area of law. Many commentators have advo-
cated unique solutions to the problems associated with rape. See generally Donald A.
Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and
the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992) (analogizing sexual intercourse
as a commodity and rape as violation of that commodity such that rape laws should
be reformed to reflect a woman's property interest in her own body). But see Robin
L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L
REV. 1442 (1993) (responding to and rejecting aspects of Dripps' proposal).
4. See infra notes 5-10.
5. 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994).
6. Id. at 1186-88. For a thorough discussion of Iniguez, see infra notes 181-93
and accompanying text.
7. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
8. Id. at 1164. For a discussion of Berkowitz, see infra notes 123-50 and accom-
panying text.
9. 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
10. Id. at 1285. For a complete discussion of MT.S., see infra notes 92-103 and
accompanying text.
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Part II of this Comment will address the standard elements of rape,
including the resistance requirement." This section will also illustrate
that even though most states have statutorily abolished the resistance
requirement, many courts still expect a victim to demonstrate passive
resistance when confronted with a sexual assault. Part III will discuss
the rationale behind the intrinsic force standard and the cases to which
it has been applied. 2 Part IV will analyze the Berkowitz holding and
the jurisdictions that require that the defendant exert some degree of
physical force or threat of force in order to constitute rape. 3 Part V
will discuss the Iniguez holding and the rationale behind the "fear stan-
dard," which still requires that the defendant forcibly penetrate the vic-
tim, but allows the prosecution to prove that the defendant forcibly
overcame the victim's will with evidence that the victim subjectively
feared immediate bodily injury. 4
II. TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS OF RAPE
A. The Resistance Requirement
Until relatively recently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove that the victim resisted the defendant as an essential element of
rape.' Originally, the courts applied the "utmost resistance" standard,
which required that the victim'6 resist to the upper limits of her physi-
cal ability in order to satisfactorily demonstrate that she was raped."
Later cases did not interpret this standard as strictly.8 While resis-
11. See infra notes 15-84 and accompanying text
12. See infra notes 85-120 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 121-53 and accompanying text; see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95
YALE LJ. 1087 (1986). Professor Estrich has authored several works dealing with rape
and is widely recognized as one of the leading authorities on the subject. In her arti-
cle, Estrich notes the difference between the varying standards of force in rape. "The
distinction between the 'force' incidental to the act of intercourse and the 'force'
required to convict a man of rape is one commonly drawn by the courts." Id. at
1107. It is this distinction that separates jurisdictions applying an extrinsic force stan-
dard from those that subscribe to the intrinsic force rationale.
14. See iqara notes 154-220 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 16-53 and accompanying text.
16. Women are not the only targets of rape. In fact, a recent study estimates that
at least "ten percent of rape victims are men." Lani A. Remick, Comment, Read Her
Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L REV. 1103,
1106 (1993).
17. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
18. By the early 1970s, society's disassociation from resistance began to manifest
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tance was still an element of rape, the courts explicitly recognized that
not every victim was capable of offering the same degree of resis-
tance."9 By the late 1970s, most states had replaced the utmost resis-
tance requirement with a "reasonable resistance" standard which re-
quired that the victim "offer so much resistance as is reasonable under
the circumstances."2" Although this standard was designed to alleviate
the harshness of the utmost resistance requirement, it often prejudiced
the victim because it effectively removed the subjective component of
fear that the victim might wish to present in order to explain her
unique reaction to the particular circumstances.2 Thus, the reasonable-
ness standard objectified the rape analysis because it did not allow
consideration of the victim's own account of the attack.2
itself in case decisions. For example, in State v. Harris, the court, while still ac-
knowledging the validity of the resistance requirement, noted that the victim did not
have to resist to the limits of her physical ability in order for the prosecution to
prove rape. 174 A.2d 645, 648 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
19. See State v. Waters, 135 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Wis. 1965) (holding that the "utmost
resistance" standard is relaxed in cases where physical resistance would be fruitless).
But see State v. Muhammad, 162 N.W.2d 567 (Wis. 1968). Muhammad is represen-
tative of the type of cases in which courts began to reexamine the logic and even
the feasibility of the utmost resistance standard. In Muhammad, the defendant pinned
the victim down on the bed, took off her clothes, and put his hand over her mouth
so that she was unable to breath. Id. at 568. The defendant attempted to extricate
herself from the defendant's grip, but was unsuccessful. Id. at 568-69. The court rea-
soned that the utmost resistance standard was not absolute. Id. at 570. "While the
law requires the utmost resistance as evidence of the woman's will, the law does not
require the useless or the impossible. The strict physical-resistance requirement is re-
laxed somewhat if it would be useless to resist." Id. (citation omitted). The court,
however, found that the complainant did not exert the proper degree of resistance.
Id. In support of its holding, the court thought it important to note the fact that the
victim was of "unchaste character," due to the fact she was no longer a virgin and
she had "considerable experience" with men. Id. at 571.
20. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130.00(8) (McKinney 1977) (repealed 1981). The statute
stated that the victim must offer "earnest" resistance, which was defined as the type
of resistance that could reasonably be expected by an individual who refuses to en-
gage in intercourse. Id.; see also People v. Dozier, 447 N.Y.S.2d 35, 36-37 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1981) (Main, J., dissenting) (arguing that resistance need only be reasonable
under the circumstances); State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 534-35 (Wash. Ct. App.
1989) (reasoning that resistance was reasonable under the circumstances).
21. In foreshadowing the next phase of the evolution of rape reform, the court in
People v. Dorsey acknowledged that the abolition of the resistance requirement would
be an "enlightened viewpoint which would eliminate this problem altogether." 429
N.Y.S.2d 828, 832 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). This theory, however, was still several years
away from judicial acceptance.
22. The Dorsey court emphasized this exact point in its analysis.
The resistance must be such as might be expected from a woman in the
victim's circumstances. This, plus the reasonableness required removes the
victim's opinion from the case. The concern is not with what she thought
was necessary, but what would reasonably appear necessary to a woman in
1280
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Eventually, states began to reform their rape statutes to altogether
eliminate the resistance requirement. 3 This change manifested itself
primarily in the deletion of the requirement that the victim must physi-
cally attempt to resist her attacker.24 Correspondingly, courts began to
conclude that the prosecution could establish the element of force even
in the absence of resistance by the victim.25 The courts also acknowl-
her position.
Id. (quoting Roger B. Dworkin, Note, Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18
STAN. L. REV. 680, 685 (1966)). The inherent weakness of this standard is that it de-
feats the very rationale that brought about its existence, which is the fact that not
every victim reacts similarly to rape. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify
how a rape victim would react under "same or similar circumstances." See also State
v. Reed, 276 S.E.2d 313, 317-18 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that earnest resistance is to be
measured under the reasonableness of the surrounding circumstances).
23. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West 1991). Other states have
gradually manifested an intent to eliminate the resistance requirement. See State v.
Siering, 644 A.2d 958, 962 n.6 (Conn. App. Ct) (stating that the victim need not offer
resistance because the use or threat of force sufficiently constitutes forcible compul-
sion), petition for certification to appeal denied, 648 A.2d 158 (Conn. 1994); State v.
Adams, 880 P.2d 226, 230 (law. Ct. App.) (stating that "physical or verbal resistance
is not an element that needs to be proven" in rape cases), cert. denied, 884 P.2d
1149 (Haw. 1994); State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261, 1269 (Kan. 1994) (stating that
the degree of force constituting rape is only that amount necessary to overcome the
victim's will because the victim "need not endure a beating . . . in order to satisfy
that requirement"); State v. Oliver, 627 A.2d 144, 151 (N.J. 1993) (stating that physical
force in addition to actual penetration is sufficient to constitute force); In re Dakota
EE, 618 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that an implied or express
threat of force is sufficient to prove forcible compulsion); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d
662, 672 (S.D. 1994) (noting that resistance is no longer an element of the rape stat-
ute).
24. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1087.
[T]he law, as reflected in the opinions of the courts, the interpretation, if not
the words, of the statutes, and decisions of those within the criminal justice
system, often tell us that no crime has taken place and that fault, if any is
to be recognized, belongs with the woman.
Id. at 1092.
25. People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1186-87 (Cal. 1994); see infra notes 154-93
and accompanying text; see also Curtis v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976) (not-
ing that the victim's failure to resist due to a reasonable fear of the defendant consti-
tuted forcible compulsion); Johnson v. State, 456 S.E.2d 251, 254 (Ga- Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that defendant's threats of physical retribution toward child-victim constituted
force by intimidation); State v. Hammon, 781 P.2d 1063, 1068 (Kan. 1989) (reasoning
that an "argument of insufficient force is without merit" when the defendant forced
himself upon the victim "without her consent."); State v. Nixon, 858 S.W.2d 782, 785
(Mo. CL App. 1993) (stating that forcible compulsion may be established by proving
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edged the inequity of requiring resistance from the victim in order to
prove rape when the defendant created the conditions that set up the
attack.26 Further, courts recognized that some women, faced with the
daunting prospect of an unwanted sexual assault, find themselves para-
lyzed with a fear that subsequently renders them unable to offer any
resistance.27
Other states have been more reluctant to drop the resistance re-
quirement.2" In fact, some courts have embraced the concept of resis-
tance as a quantifiable tool in adjudicating a defendant's guilt or inno-
cence.2 For example, in Farish v. Commonwealth,' the court held
that the defendant caused the victim to entertain a reasonable fear of physical inju-
ry); State v. Jones, 809 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that fear of bodily
injury may constitute forcible compulsion); People v. Rozanski, 619 N.Y.S.2d 441, 442
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that evidence of victim's fear of immediate bodily inju-
ry was sufficient to constitute forcible compulsion), appeal denied, 647 N.E.2d 466
(N.Y. 1995); Dakota EE, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 135 (holding that defendant's subjugation of
victim, including placing his hand over victim's mouth, created reasonable fear of
bodily injury in victim, thus satisfying forcible compulsion element). But see Common-
wealth v. Feijoo, 646 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Mass. 1995) (holding that victim's submission
to intercourse was not induced by fear of bodily injury, but rather out of an expecta-
tion for future benefits, thereby failing to establish forcible compulsion by fear).
26. See, e.g., Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1189-90. "There is no requirement that the victim
say, 'I am afraid, please stop,' when it is the defendant who has created circumstanc-
es that have so paralyzed the victim in fear and thereby submission." Id.
27. Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1186-87; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28. See Howell v. State, 636 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Ala. 1993) (noting that the relevant
rape statute lists "the overcoming of earnest resistance" as an element of rape); Peo-
ple v. Nelson, 499 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (111. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that victim who
maintained control of faculties and physical abilities must demonstrate some degree
of resistance), appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. 1987); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d
190, 194-95 (La. 1994) (noting that resistance is still an element of rape), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2252; State v. Nixon, 858 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (implying
that resistance may be a factor in rape in certain circumstances); Elliott v. State, 858
S.W.2d 478, 484 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that resistance as an element of rape is
measured on a sliding scale depending on the degree of resistance that may be ex-
pected under the circumstances); State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532 (Wash. Ct. App.
1989); Madison v. State, 212 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Wis. 1973) (noting that some degree of
resistance, although dependent on the specific factual circumstances, may be required
of the victim in order to prove rape); State v. Muhammad, 162 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Wis.
1968) (holding that victim's resistance is element of rape and is measured by the
subjective degree of resistance of which the victim is capable). In McKnight, the
court acknowledged that in some cases physical resistance was still required to show
"forcible compulsion," but it was eager to limit its application. 774 P.2d at 534. "We
find no rational basis for requiring resistance to be manifest in all cases by physical
means, and in fact, are persuaded that public policy considerations militate against
such a requirement" Id. The court reasoned that a victim who was weak and alone
in her apartment was not required to "subject herself to a physical contest or to
provoke a threat" in order for the prosecution to show the forcible compulsion ele-
ment. Id. at 535-36 n.2.
29. For example, until as recently as 1980, the California Penal Code defined rape
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that while resistance was no longer a requirement of rape, proof of the
victim's lack of resistance would strengthen the defendant's defense of
consent to the intercourse.' In Farish, the defendant contended that
the prosecution bore the burden of establishing that the victim exhibit-
ed the maximum amount of resistance under the circumstances.'
Farish is representative of the subtle reluctance of many courts to
completely abolish the resistance requirement. It demonstrates the
school of thought that treats resistance as evidence of nonconsent,
rather than perceiving the resistance requirement in terms of lack of
force. Although in many jurisdictions the victim is no longer required to
resist, she is effectively penalized for not; attempting to repel her
attacker's advances.'
as "an act of sexual intercourse under circumstances where the person resists, but
where 'resistance is overcome by force or violence' or where 'a person is prevented
from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanies by appar-
ent power of execution.'" CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1980) (emphasis added); see
State v. Matthews, 643 So. 2d 854, 858 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (reasoning that the defen-
dant exhibited sufficient forcible compulsion due in part to the victim's physical resis-
tance as per the relevant rape statute); State v. Marlow, 888 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994) (noting that forcible compulsion "include[s] physical force that overcomes
reasonable resistance'"); State v. Kitt, 879 P.2d 1348, 1349 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that the rape statute included resistance in its definition of forcible compul-
sion).
30. 346 S.E.2d 736 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
31. Id. at 738-39. Section 18.2-67.6 of the Virginia Annotated Code provides:
The Commonwealth need not demonstrate that the complaining witness cried
out or physically resisted the accused in order to convict the accused of an
offense under this article, but the absence of such resistance may be consid-
ered when relevant to show that the act alleged was not against the will of
the complaining witness.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (Michie 1988).
32. Farish, 346 S.E.2d at 738-39.
33. This point is more clearly pronounced in State v. Lovato, in which the defen-
dant contended that the victim's failure to verbally resist was dispositive in finding
that no sexual abuse occurred. 702 P.2d 101, 108 (Utah 1985). The supreme court
balked on the issue of resistance and refused to definitively state that the victim is
not compelled to verbally resist Id. "Whether an outcry should have been made,
depends upon how practical and effective it might have been." Id. (quoting State v.
Studham, 572 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1977)); see also State v. Parish, 405 So. 2d 1080,
1087 (La. 1981) (reasoning that the defendant did not attempt to rape the victim be-
cause he failed to exert great force and the victim emerged from encounter substan-
tially unscathed).
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B. Passive Resistance
Perhaps the most important attribute of resistance that still com-
mands a great deal of attention today is the fact that the requirement
has only been recently abolished by some states.' As such, its perva-
sive effects relative to the force element are still present in the discus-
sions of many modem opinions. Thus, despite the fact that many states
have completely eliminated the resistance requirement from their rape
laws, its impact is still felt in the form of passive resistance." Passive
resistance, although difficult to define with any measure of exactitude,
basically comprises the victim's verbal and non-physical responses to a
rape . 6 Courts have struggled, however, to illuminate the practical dif-
ferences between passive resistance and traditional active resistance.
For example, in People v. Salazar," the court acknowledged the Cali-
fornia legislature's intent that a victim no longer needed to resist her
attacker in order to show rape.' The court, however, reasoned that
the elimination of resistance placed an emphasis on the element of
force.39 Courts have been far more reluctant to dispose of the implied
passive resistance that is sometimes expected of the victim. Many opin-
ions do not generally distinguish between physical and verbal resistance
explicitly, but it is apparent that courts themselves are often unclear as
34. State v. Mezrioui, 602 A.2d 29, 32-33 (Conn. App. Ct.) (reasoning that the vic-
tim need not attempt physical or verbal resistance against her attacker), petition for
certification to appeal denied, 617 A.2d 169 (1992); People v. Bowen, 609 N.E.2d 346,
356 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that failure of victim to verbally resist is not determinative
on whether defendant exerted sufficient amount of force), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d
339 (IlM.), and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 387 (1993). But see State v. Simmons, 621 So.
2d 1135, 1138 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the defendant did not exert sufficient
force to constitute rape where the victim verbally told the defendant to "stop" at-
tempting to penetrate her vagina yet "could [not] have reasonably believed that resis-
tance would not prevent intercourse").
35. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1123-24.
36. See State v. Juhasz, 865 P.2d 178, 180 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (stating that forc-
ible compulsion included "resistance by force or violence or to prevent [resistance]
by threats of immediate and great bodily harm"); Morse v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d
145, 149 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (expounding upon the differences between "intimidation"
and "threat of force" in the context of forcible compulsion).
37. 193 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1983).
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. From the prosecutor's point of view, this simultaneously solves one prob-
lem and creates another. At least with the presence of resistance, the state could
more easily show that the defendant forcibly raped the victim. Consequently, with the
elimination of resistance, courts generally became more demanding in the requirement
that the prosecution show that the defendant forcibly raped the victim. Thus, it
seems that in some extrinsic force jurisdictions, the elimination of resistance does
little to enhance the victim's chances of establishing that she had been raped. See
Estrich, supra note 13, at 1130.
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to whether verbal resistance is required." In other words, some courts,
while not explicitly acknowledging it, still expect some type of passive
resistance from the victim-the utterance of "no" is an often cited ex-
ample-to demonstrate to them that intercourse was indeed
nonconsensual.4 This procedure is defended on the ground that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt mandates some type of renunciation of the
legality of the intercourse by the victim beyond her mere statement,
made with the benefit of hindsight, that she did not consent.
Other courts have proceeded along the logic that resistance should
not be bifurcated into physical and verbal classifications. If the broad
40. Compare People v. Nelson, 499 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (IIl. App. Ct. 1986) (stating
that physical resistance is no longer required of the victim), appeal denied, 505
N.E.2d 359 (IlM. 1987) and State v. Jackson, 620 A.2d 168, 172 (Conn. App. C) (rea-
soning that verbal resistance is not required to establish forcible compulsion), peti-
tion for certification to appeal denied, 623 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1993) with State v.
Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475-76 (N.C. 1984) (noting that despite the abolition of physi-
cal resistance requirement, the prosecution nonetheless failed to prove that the defen-
dant exhibited the requisite amount of force).
The reluctance to statutorily abolish the verbal resistance requirement is reflect-
ed in the recent statutory revision of the Texas rape provision. The 1974 Penal Code
tied the force element to "resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution." TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 21.02(b)(2) (West 1974) (amended 1983). In 1975, the code was changed
to allow for the imposition of a "threat ... that would prevent reasonable resis-
tance . .. because of a reasonable fear of harm." Id. at § 21.02(b)(3) (West 1975)
(amended 1983). Finally, the legislature recodified § 21.02 to eliminate physical resis-
tance from the statutory definition of rape. Id. at § 22.011(b) (West 1983). It is un-
clear what effect, if any, this latest revision will have on the level of verbal resis-
tance that is required by the victim in order for the prosecution to effectively prove
rape. A recent supreme court case has acknowledged that resistance may still consti-
tute an element of rape in certain circumstances. See Alexander v. State, 866 S.W.2d
1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (noting that the current Texas rape statute calls for
"such earnest resistance as might be reasonably expected under the circumstances"),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1869 (1994); Elliott v. State, 858 S.W.2d 478, 484-85 (Tex.
Crim. App.) (noting that resistance may be appropriate under circumstances where it
may reasonably be expected), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 563 (1993).
Other jurisdictions have similarly struggled with arriving at a satisfactory answer
to the verbal resistance problem. See State v. Mezrioui, 602 A.2d 29, 32-33 (Conn.
App. Ct) (finding that it is not incumbent upon rape victim to physically or verbally
resist her attacker), cert. denied, 617 A.2d 169 (Conn. 1992); Farish v. Common-
wealth, 346 S.E.2d 736, 738-39 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting statute which does not
require victim to "cry out" or physically resist her attacker). But see Elliott, 858
S.W.2d at 484 (interpreting rape statute to require resistance where reasonable under
the circumstances).
41. See supra note 40.
42. Mezrioui, 602 A.2d at 32-33; see also People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 120 (Cal.
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category of resistance has statutorily been removed as a requirement to
prove rape, then it should make no difference whether the victim de-
clines to resist physically or verbally. The rationale behind this perspec-
tive is reflective of the anomaly that resistance has been interpreted
somewhat narrowly as encompassing only physical dimensions, while
largely ignoring other types of less tangible forms of opposition.43
While this policy seems compatible with the trend toward the aboli-
tion of the resistance requirement, it presents a peculiar problem for
the prosecution in proving rape. When the victim was required to dem-
onstrate resistance, such resistance not only went to the issue of con-
sent, but also to whether the defendant forcibly overcame the victim's
will. Now, in certain circumstances, the absence of resistance may iron-
ically defeat the prosecution's case as a result of its inability to show
force due to lack of evidence of forcible compulsion." This anomalous
1986) (holding that it was inappropriate to instruct the jury that the victim must have
resisted in order to return guilty verdict because legislative changes had "brought the
law of rape into conformity with other crimes ... which require force, fear, and
nonconsent to convict"); People v. Bermudez, 203 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the "criminal invasion of sexual privacy does not become a non-rape
merely because the victim is too fearful . . .to say 'I guess you know I don't want
you to do this'"); People v. Salazar, 193 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1983) (reasoning
that the California Legislature clearly manifested an intent to eliminate any require-
ment of resistance on the part of rape victims); State v. Adams, 880 P.2d 226, 233-35
(Haw. Ct. App.) (noting that neither physical nor verbal resistance is required to
demonstrate forcible compulsion) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 884 P.2d 1149 (Haw.
1994); State v. Oliver, 627 A.2d 144, 151 (N.J. 1993) (noting that the focus of forcible
compulsion is entirely on the conduct of the defendant, not the victim); People v.
Cook, 588 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (holding that "[n]either physical in-
jury, nor screaming or crying out are required to prove forcible compulsion). But see
People v. Geneva, 554 N.E.2d 556, 563 (M. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that physical resis-
tance was not required of the victim in order to prove force).
43. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1124-25.
[Clourts are left either to emphasize the 'light choking' or to look for threats
of force .... That a woman feels genuinely afraid, that a man has created
the situation that she finds frightening . . .may not be enough to constitute
the necessary force or even implicit threat of force . . . under the law of
rape.
Id. at 1115. This is the basis of the rationale behind the imposition of the fear
standard implemented by several jurisdictions regarding the amount of force exerted by
the defendant. See ifra notes 154-220 and accompanying text; see also Commonwealth
v. Caracciola, 569 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Mass. 1991) (reasoning that forcible compulsion is
not limited only to physical force); State v. Wilkins, 415 N.E.2d 303, 307 (Ohio 1980)
(analyzing force as coercion that would prevent resistance by an ordinary person).
44. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1106 (citing Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644
(1897) (reversing defendant's conviction of rape on grounds that the force, which was
incidental to the act of rape, was insufficient when combined with the victim's pas-
sive resistance)). Thus, when the display of force is less apparent, either due to the
circumstances of the attack or a lack of resistance, the prosecution's burden of pro-
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result occurs when a lack of physical resistance induces the court to
conclude that the intercourse was lawful because the only evidence
present is the victim's word against the defendant's.45 As the emphasis
shifted away from physical resistance, courts focused greater attention
on the amount of force exerted by the defendant." The degree of
physical resistance thus enabled the court to gauge the amount of force
used by the defendant.47 This was a useful tool in evaluating whether
the defendant exercised sufficient force in order to override the victim's
will.' Part of the reasoning behind this rationale stems from the fact
that resistance is often a reliable indicator of force.49 In essence, the
victim faced the unattractive choice of either risking physical injury in
duction becomes more difficult. "[W]hen the force is more of the variety considered
'incidental' to sex, or when the situation is threatening but no explicit threat of harm
is communicated, 'force' . . . may not be present at all." Id.
45. Some states explicitly exempt a husband from raping his wife. See, e.g., CAL
PENAL CODE § 261(a) (West 1982). For an in depth discussion of the spousal immuni-
ty provision particular to rape, see Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine in New Bottle:
The "Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, More on Distinguishing Sex, Sexual Expropria-
tion, and Sexual Assault: A Reply to Professor West, 93 COLUM. L REV. 1460 (1993).
Professor Dripps authored this article in response to Professor West's article in which
she criticized, among other things, Dripps' analysis of what constitutes violent sexual
intercourse. Id. at 1461-62; see West, supra note 3, at 1449-55. Much of the debate
centering around rape involves not only legal issues regarding consent and force, but
the moral issues associated with sexual intercourse.
Legality does not imply legitimacy, any more than consent implies value.
Many of our sexual practices may be beyond the reach of any sensible un-
derstanding the scope of the criminal law. But it does not follow that they
are commendable, or even noninjurious. What does follow is that they are in
need of criticism, whether or not in need of punishment.
Id. at 1459. Thus, perhaps to a greater degree with rape than with other crimes, an
individual's personal beliefs as to what constitutes moral sexual practices are more of-
ten intertwined with the legal analysis or proposition advocating rape reform.
47. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536 (Wis. 1906) (reversing defendant's rape
conviction on the basis that victim did not offer enough resistance). But see People
v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994) (reasoning that the victim need not exert verbal
resistance because the element of resistance is no longer part of the relevant rape
statute); State v. Jackson, 620 A.2d 168 (Conn. Ct. App.) (reasoning that the defen-
dant was not required to offer even verbal resistance in order to prove forcible com-
pulsion), petition for certification to appeal denied, 623 A.2d 1026 (Conn. 1993).
48. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
49. See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992) ("Resistance, often
demonstrated by torn clothing and blood, was a sign that the defendant had used
significant force to accomplish the sexual intercourse.").
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attempting to resist in order to establish at trial that the defendant forc-
ibly overcame her will or submitting to the attack. If the victim elected
to submit, however, she risked the possibility that the court might find
that the defendant did not commit rape because the prosecution lacked
any evidence to prove that the defendant displayed the required amount
of force since the victim did not resist the attack. This is primarily be-
cause the line between lawful sex and rape is often blurred.'
Further, courts and commentators have acknowledged the reality that
some victims "freeze up" and become paralyzed with fear when con-
fronted with a rape situation." Thus, the abolition of the resistance re-
quirement is somewhat misleading in that it is not entirely clear what
degree of passive resistance is expected from the victim. 2 Clearly,
however, some courts have merely replaced the traditional resistance
requirement with a more subtle form of resistance.'
C. Mens Rea
With most crimes, the brunt of the court's fact-finding often centers
around whether the defendant possessed the requisite mens rea. This
approach, however, does not generally extend to rape. Most courts
choose to ignore the mens rea element and concentrate their analysis
on the issue of consent.' This occurs partly because of the inherent
50. See Lucy R. Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of
Rape, 43 U. CHI. L REV. 613 (1976) (analyzing various approaches distinguishing con-
sensual intercourse from rape).
51. See Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1187; see also Jackson, 620 A.2d at 172 (stating that
verbal resistance is not required of the victim in proving forcible compulsion); Curtis
v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976) (noting that the victim's lack of resistance,
provoked by the defendant's creation of fearful circumstances, constitutes force);
State v. Berthwick, 880 P.2d 1261, 1268 (Kan. 1994) (noting that "violent assaults and
life-threatening actions are not necessary to sustain a 'force or fear' rape conviction);
State v. Wright, 598 So. 2d 561, 565 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (finding sufficient evidence to
support defendant's rape conviction where the victim was unable to resist due to fear
of defendant).
52. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
53. This fear was echoed by many women's rights groups following the Berkowitz
decision. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). "This court deci-
sion invalidates the reality that any nonconsensual intercourse is rape .... The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed the societal myth that a victim must resist to her ut-
most, risking physical harm before a rape charge can be brought." Rape Ruling: Say-
ing "No" Wasn't Enough Women's Groups Decry Pennsylvania Decision, CHI. TRIB.,
June 3, 1994, at 1. Others felt that the ruling would put victims in greater danger by
encouraging resistance. "'[The] concern is that this kind of ruling will take us back to
a time when you have to do something, when the victim has to put herself in some
degree of danger.'" Id.
54. For a more detailed analysis of the reluctance of courts to effectively deal
with the mens rea element of rape, see Estrich, supra note 13, at 1095; see also Peo-
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difficulties in defining the exact parameters of the requisite mens rea
for rape." Of the few courts that have addressed this issue, most have
agreed that the defendant need not have a specific intent to engage in
unlawful intercourse, reasoning that a general intent to commit the act
will suffice.' Understandably, courts have wavered on what consti-
tutes the general intent necessary to convict a rape defendant. 7 Never-
theless, the actual mens rea standard for rape is beyond the scope of
this article.' The underlying point is that the few courts which have
ple v. Brown, 495 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (reasoning that the prosecu-
tion need not prove that the defendant possessed the specific intent to exert force
because rape is a general intent crime); State v. Trackwell, 509 N.W.2d 638, 645
(Neb. 1994) (reasoning that intent is not an element of rape); State v. Aumick, 869
P.2d 421, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that intent is not an element of rape,
although it is an element of the crime of attempted rape). But cf. Ex Parte Cofer,
440 So. 2d 1121, 1124 (Ala. 1983) (reasoning that first-degree sexual abuse requires
that the prosecution demonstrate that the defendant acted with the requisite "intent
to gratify the sexual desires of himself or the prosecutrix"); People v. Ward, 597
N.Y.S.2d 178, 179 (N.Y. App. Div.) (concluding that defendant maintained requisite
intent to commit rape), appeal denied, 619 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1993).
55. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1096-98.
56. See Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 116 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (holding that rape
is a general intent crime); State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 715 (Conn. 1989) (rejecting
defendant's contention that specific intent is required for a rape conviction), cert.
denied, Smith v. Liburdi, 580 A.2d 60 (Conn. 1990); State v. Rothenberg, 487 A.2d
545, 549 (Conn. 1984) (holding that sexual assault is a general intent crime); Garnett
v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 803 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the prosecution does not
have to prove the mens rea element of rape); Commonwealth v. Grant, 464 N.E.2d
33, 35 (Mass. 1984) (reasoning that specific intent is not an element of rape); State v.
Washington, 869 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that rape does not
include element of intent); State v. Neumann, 508 N.W.2d 54, 61 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(stating that the prosecution is not required to show proof of intent in order to ob-
tain a rape conviction).
57. For example, in Commonwealth v. Sherry, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
specifically rejected defendant's claim that the applicable rape statute required a spe-
cific intent to engage in unlawful intercourse. 437 N.E.2d 224, 226 (Mass. 1982). In
the same breath, however, the court hinted that a "reasonable, good faith mistake of
fact" could constitute a valid defense toward the issue of consent. Id. at 233. Regard-
less of the soundness of the reasoning, the court correctly differentiated the elements
of intent and consent. The watershed California case addressing the intent element of
rape, People v. Mayberry, correctly distinguished the mens rea element of rape in
holding that if the defendant maintained a "reasonable and bona fide belief" that the
victim consented to the intercourse, the defendant did not entertain the necessary
wrongful intent necessary to commit the crime of rape. 542 P.2d 1337, 1345 (Cal.
1975); see also State v. Walden, 841 P.2d 81, 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (reasoning that
the crime of rape does not require proof of intent, yet the crime of assault does re-
quire that the prosecution demonstrate the requisite degree of intent).
58. For a more in-depth analysis of mens rea and rape, see Estrich, supra note 13,
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dealt with the mens rea of a rape defendant and separate the issue of
force from consent have correctly noted the difference between the
three elements. 9 The reluctance of the majority of courts to separately
analyze the defendant's intent from the issue of the victim's consent
effectively shifts the emphasis of the analysis from the conduct of the
rapist to the defensive choice of the victim in reacting to the rape situa-
tion.'
D. Nonconsent
It is important to distinguish the issue of nonconsent from force.61
Although courts often deal with both elements together, mostly because
the existence of force often, if not always, demonstrates nonconsent,
the two are separate and distinct elements. 2 In fact, one court has
held that the proof of force is always dispositive in determining lack of
consent.' Although consent is generally viewed as a defense that the
at 1096-1105. Estrich is one of the few commentators who addresses mens rea in the
context of rape. Estrich makes the interesting point that the courts' refusal to analyze
mens rea in the context of rape is disadvantageous to the victim. Id. at 1096. This
seemingly paradoxical result occurs because the emphasis shifts from the mental
state and potential guilt of the defendant, to the conduct of the victim by focusing
on whether she consented. Id. at 1098. "[T]he inquiry into the victim's nonconsent
puts the woman, not the man, on trial. Her intent, not his, is disputed; and because
her state of mind is key, her sexual history may be considered relevant . . . ." Id. at
1099. This "trial of the victim" is often cited by commentators as one of the most
glaring weaknesses in the criminal justice system's traditional approach to rape.
59. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
60. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1099.
61. Some authorities have acknowledged the judicial schism regarding the analysis
of force and consent as two separate, although related, elements to rape. See Harris,
supra note 50. Thus, courts often focus on the defendant's conduct in ascertaining
the degree of force exerted. The problem with this traditional analysis is that it mini-
mizes the victim's reaction to the defendant's attack, usually concluding that the
victim's inaction necessarily communicated her consent, in analyzing the element of
force. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1111-12. The fear standard, as illustrated in
Iniguez, purports to rectify this defective reasoning by allowing testimony of the
victim's fear of imminent physical injury as evidence of force. For a detailed discus-
sion of the fear standard see infra notes 154-220 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Estrich, supra note 13, at 1087; Donna J. Case, Comment, Condom or
Not, Rape is Rape in the Era of Aids-Does Condom Use Constitute Consent, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 227 (1993) (advocating that the victim's request that attacker use a
condom does not constitute consent).
63. People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 50 (III. 1987). In this case, the court stated
that the establishment beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant exercised force
was tantamount to proving the victim did not consent. Id. "To prove the element of
force is implicitly to show nonconsent. Too, if force is established it would be re-
dundant to require a separate showing of nonconsent as part of the prosecution's
case in chief." Id. While this is an interesting digression, it is largely academic in
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defendant asserts to most crimes, the prosecution must prove a lack of
consent as an element.' One of the most fundamental problems asso-
ciated with rape is the lack of accord over what constitutes
nonconsent." This point is clearly illustrated in Berkowitz, where the
court affirmed a defendant's acquittal of rape despite the fact that the
victim stated "no" during the sexual encounter.' Without purporting to
comment on the viability or reliability of a verbal consent standard,
courts have clearly thus far been unwilling to adopt such a system be-
cause the facts and circumstances of the case may contradict a victim's
verbal utterances in the face of a sexual encounter. 7 Thus, in light of
the judicial unwillingness to arrive at a conforming and consistent stan-
dard as to what constitutes nonconsent, the focus on the evidence pre-
sented at trial becomes even more crucial.'
most cases. If the defendant contests the issue of consent, the prosecution still has
the burden of proving nonconsent and force beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus,
this equation only seems to work when the victim's consent is not at issue, yet most
rape cases hinge on whether the victim consented.
64. For a more in-depth analysis of the issue of consent, see Remick, supra note
16; see also State v. Hawldns, 504 So. 2d 1132 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the
victim's fear of defendant and lack of encouragement constituted nonconsent); State
v. Oliver, 627 A.2d 144, 151 (N.J. 1993) (holding that the ultimate issue in rape de-
pends on the "affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act
of penetration"); State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, 671 (S.D. 1994) (reasoning that lack
of consent may be shown by proving that the victim capitulated to the defendant out
of fear of physical violence or bodily injury).
65. Remick, supra note 16, at 1105. Although there have been numerous articles
articulating the need for some standard by which a court can measure whether a
woman has or has not consented, such a standard has thus far eluded the courts.
See State v. Rivera, 621 A.2d 298, 299 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (reasoning that force is
the converse of consent and when forcible compulsion is proven, "lack of consent is
implicit"); State v. Cahill, 845 P.2d 624 (Kan. 1993) (holding that the age of a victim
may prevent affirmative consent).
66. See infra notes 123-50 and accompanying text.
67. New Jersey may be the exception to this rule. In State ex rel. M.T.S., the
court held that "any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without
the affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act of pene-
tration constitutes the offense of sexual assault." 609 A-2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992); see
also Oliver, 627 A.2d 144 (reasoning that the focus of consent never shifts to the
victim's state of mind, it always remains on the reasonableness of the defendant's
conception that the victim has affirmatively assented to intercourse); supra note 65
and accompanying text.
68. See generally John D. Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time for "No" to Really Mean
"No", 21 AM. J. CRiM. L. 3 (1993) (analyzing the aspects and problems associated with
nonconsensual intercourse).
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E. The Force Element
The evolution of the force element has been one of the greatest
changes affecting rape statutes during the past decade.' Currently, the
rape statutes of most jurisdictions require that the victim demonstrate
that the accused display some degree of force or threat of force suffi-
cient to overcome the victim's will." Nevertheless, the actual degree of
force is subject to considerable dispute and variation.7'
One of the earliest cases dealing with force and consequently setting
a precedent was Mills v. United States.72 In Mills, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the rape conviction of the defendant because
the requisite amount of force necessary to constitute rape was lack-
ing.73 The defendant threatened the victim's husband at gunpoint, and
ordered him to leave the premises.74 The defendant compelled the vic-
tim to have intercourse under the threat of physical injury.7
The district court instructed the jury that because the victim did not
consent, the only force necessary to accomplish rape is the comnnission
of the act itself." The Supreme Court, however, found the trial court's
jury instructions erroneous and remanded the case for a retrial.77 The
Court reasoned that the defendant did not exhibit a sufficient amount
of force necessary to constitute rape.8 In support of its holding, the
Court stated:
69. The issue of what is sufficient to constitute force has eluded both courts and
commentators alike. The problem basically rests in distinguishing whether extrinsic
(or some modified version of it such as the fear standard) or intrinsic force will gov-
ern whether the defendant exhibited the requisite degree of force.
[W]hen some time elapses between the force and intercourse, when the force
is more of the variety considered 'incidental' to sex, or when the situation is
threatening but no explicit threat of harm is communicated, "force" as de-
fined and required by the criminal law may not be present at all. In such
cases, the law fails to recognize, let alone protect, a woman's interest in
bodily integrity.
Estrich, supra note 13, at 1106; Wiggins v. State, 432 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(noting that the degree of force in incest is different than the standard of force in
rape).
70. The exception to this general rule is seen in MTS., 609 A.2d 1266 (reasoning
that force in rape is inherent in the penetration); see infra notes 92-110 and accom-
panying text.
71. See, e.g., note 121 and accompanying text.
72. 164 U.S. 644 (1897).
73. Id. at 649.
74. Id. at 645-46.
75. Id. at 646.
76. Id. at 647.
77. Id. at 649.
78. Id.
1292
[Vol. 23: 1277, 1996] Rape
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The mere nonconsent of a female to intercourse where she is in possession of her
natural, mental and physical powers, is not overcome by numbers or terrified by
threats, or in such place and position that resistance would be useless, does not
constitute the crime of rape on the part of the man who has connection with her
under such circumstances. More force is necessary... to make out that element
of that crimeY'
The Court seemed to believe that the jury was misled by the trial
court's instruction.' The Court's analysis of what constitutes adequate
force, however, is somewhat inconsistent. On one hand, the Court stated
that the commission of rape itself would provide the requisite amount of
force when "the woman's will or her resistance had been overcome by
threats or fright, or she had become helpless or unconscious, so that
while not consenting she still did not resist.""' In the same breath, the
Court stated that the victim was not in such a situation.' Rather, the
Court opined that the victim in this case acted passively, offered no re-
sistance whatsoever, and was not threatened.' The Court concluded,
"[S]uch nonconsent as that is no more than a mere lack of acquiescence,
and is not enough to constitute the crime of rape."'
Nevertheless, it would seem that given the facts of the case, the
victim's will could have been overcome by fright. Perhaps the Court's
failure to acknowledge that the circumstances of the encounter may have
contributed to the capitulation of the victim's will is reflective of the fact
that Mills was decided over a hundred years ago when society's view of
rape was markedly different than today. The primary import of Mills lies
in the fact that it set a precedent in requiring that in certain instances,
the defendant must demonstrate force beyond the act of raping the vic-
tim in order to sustain a conviction. Mills' contemporary impact on rape
analysis has been its explicit promulgation of the relationship of force
and resistance into the minds of early twentieth century jurists. This
influence has lead to the utmost and reasonable resistance requirements
that have only recently been abolished.
79. Id. at 648.
80. Id. at 647-48.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 648.
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III. THE INTRINSIC FORCE STANDARD
Intrinsic force is indicative of a modem trend toward the eradication
of the element of force. This process is most clearly observed in recent
court opinions that narrowly construe sexual assault provisions in favor
of the victim. For example, New Jersey defines sexual assault as "'sexual
penetration' with another person with the use of 'physical force or co-
ercion."'" While such statutes have traditionally been interpreted as re-
quiring demonstrative force beyond the act of penetration, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court held that the only force necessary was the actual
penetration.' New Jersey, like most states, reformed its rape statute in
the 1970s in order to reflect a greater understanding and deference to-
ward rape victims. The older rape laws required that the prosecution
demonstrate both that the intercourse was accomplished without the
victim's consent, and that the defendant applied the requisite amount of
force." In other words, simply because the prosecution showed that the
victim's will was effectively overcome did not correspondingly demon-
strate nonconsent. In 1978, the New Jersey Legislature enacted a new
rape law that changed the name of the crime to "sexual assault,"' de-
leted the spousal immunity provision, and replaced the resistance re-
quirement with the force elementY This legislative change obviously
begs the question: What is "force?" New Jersey has adopted an intrinsic
force standard.' Thus, New Jersey effectively eliminated the need for
the prosecution to demonstrate any extra force beyond the actual rape of
the victim. The underlying rationale for this interpretation is formulated
by comparison to crimes such as assault and battery."
85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (West 1992). The relevant portion of the statute
provides: "An actor is guilty of sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual pene-
tration with another person [and] . . .[tjhe actor uses physical force or coercion, but
the victim does not sustain severe personal injury." Id. Since the statute does not
purport to define what degree of force is necessary to constitute rape, the court had
to infer the legislative intent from the statute, something the lower court refused to
do. "We hold that the act of penetration itself cannot satisfy the element of 'physical
force or coercion' since this would render N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c(1) meaningless." In re
M.T.S, 588 A.2d 1282, 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), rev'd, 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J.
1992).
86. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266.
87. Id. at 1270-72.
88. Id. at 1275. The purpose of renaming the statute is twofold. First, it stresses
the assault aspect of the crime and includes all types of sexual contact, not only
vaginal intercourse. Id. Further, sexual assault may occur against or by either sex,
whereas rape distinctively connotes a male attacker and a female victim. Id.
89. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1278.
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This analogy is illustrated in M.T.S., where the court held that the only
force necessary to constitute rape is the act of penetration.92 In M.T.S.,
the victim testified that she fell asleep on her bed only to awake and find
her shorts and underpants removed. 3 The victim asserted that the de-
fendant was lying on top of her with his penis inside her vagina.'
The court reasoned that the prosecution needed to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that a reasonable individual would not have concluded
that a person in the victim's position would have consented to inter-
course." The court found the notion that rape was necessarily accom-
panied by violence to be archaic and outdated.' In analogizing rape to
the crimes of assault and battery, the court stated:
Sexual penetration accomplished through the use of force is unauthorized sexual
penetration .... [U]nder [the] assault and battery doctrine, any amount of force
that results in either physical injury or offensive touching is sufficient to establish
a battery. Hence, as a description of the method of achieving "sexual penetration,"
the term "physical force" serves to define and explain the acts that are offensive,
unauthorized, and unlawful."
Thus, the traditional elements of criminal battery require only an unau-
thorized touching. As harm or offensiveness are irrelevant to the battery,
so should they be similarly immaterial to rape. This interpretation has
the effect of placing rape victims on par with victims of other crimes
with respect to the burden of proof that the prosecution must satisfy in
order to show force.9' Criminal battery is not measured by the offen-
92. Id. at 1280.
93. Id. at 1268.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1279.
96. Id. at 1278.
Similarly, contrary to common myths, perpetrators generally do not use guns
or knives and victims generally do not suffer external bruises or cuts. Al-
though this more realistic and accurate view of rape only recently has
achieved widespread public circulation, it was a central concern of the pro-
ponents of reform in the 1970s.
Id. (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 1277.
98. Much of the reaction to the M.T.S. holding criticized the court's reasoning. See
Recent Cases, Rape Law-Lack of Affirmative and Freely-Given Permission-New
Jersey Supreme Court Holds that Lack of Consent Constitutes "Physical
Force"-State Ex Rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992), 106 HARv. L REV. 969 (1993)
(criticizing the reasoning of the M.T.S. decision). But see State v. Sedia, 614 So. 2d
533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reasoning that forcible compulsion is inherent in the
penetration according to the state sexual battery statute); State v. Oliver, 627 A.2d
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siveness of the contact, but whether the touching is unauthorized or
unconsented.' The degree of force is seldom at issue; it is enough that
force was exerted, however slight, to accomplish the battery."°3 As the
court expounded: "Thus, just as any unauthorized touching is a crime
under traditional laws of assault and battery, so is any unauthorized
sexual contact a crime under the reformed law of criminal sexual con-
tact, and so is any unauthorized sexual penetration a crime under the
reformed law of sexual assault."' °
The court's analysis is predicated on the basis that rape is inherently
related to assault."2 Rape and battery are essentially crimes that invade
another's privacy. This analogy is underscored by the point that only the
slightest degree of force is necessary to constitute battery. The court's
analysis has effectively shifted the inquiry to the conduct of the defen-
dant in deciding whether force was exerted. This result occurs because
the court's focus is on the assaultive and offensive nature of the
defendant's sexual contact with the victim."° Under the intrinsic force
standard, there is no examination of the degrees or shades of force exe-
cuted in order to determine whether the defendant exerted the requisite
amount of force. This is due to the fact that under this standard, the
force is inherent in the penetration. Once the prosecution establishes
penetration, seldom a problem in most rape cases, it simultaneously
establishes the force element.
144 (N.J. 1993) (reaffirming the M.T.S. interpretation of sexual assault).
99. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gregory, 1 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1938).
100. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424 (Ark. 1949).
101. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1276.
102. Id. at 1278; see also Sedia, 614 So. 2d at 535 (stating that the legislature in-
tended to establish an intrinsic force standard); Oliver, 627 A.2d at 151 (reiterating
the legislature's intent to emphasize the assaultive nature of rape).
103. The M.T.S. court noted that an inherent feature of the intrinsic force standard
accomplishes this end because it is the defendant, not the victim, who is placed in
the spotlight. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1278-79.
In applying that [intrinsic force] standard to the facts in these cases, the
focus of attention must be on the nature of the defendant's actions. The role
of the factfinder is to decide not whether engaging in an act of penetration
without permission of another person is reasonable, but only whether the
defendant's belief that the alleged victim had freely given affirmative pernis-
sion was reasonable.
Id.
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Much of the criticism surrounding MT.S. °" centered around the fear
that future defendants will be unfairly convicted of rape as a result of
the intrinsic force standard.'0 Indeed, the phrase that "[Jnape is ... an
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be de-
fended by the party tho never so innocent " "° is almost always echoed
as a warning at the mere suggestion of any sort of rape reform law. The
intrinsic force standard merely puts rape on par with the other types of
assaultive crimes where the contact need only be unlawful to constitute
force. Few would suggest that the force element of battery should be
modified to require a certain level of force or threats above and beyond
the contact itself. The intrinsic force element neither affects nor lessens
the state's burden of proving nonconsent.
Some commentators argue, however, that the court's emphasis should
focus on the defendant's forceful conduct rather than on nonconsent.
0 7
The practical result of this approach is to shift the burden of proof of
nonconsent from the prosecution to the defendant."°8 The intrinsic
force standard removes rape from the special category of violent crimes,
where most courts have pigeonholed it, and places it in the group of as-
saultive crimes where contact is measured by its unlawfulness, and not
104. The M.T.S. decision dealt with issues that are outside of the scope of this
comment, such as consent and misinterpretation of legislative intent. Much of the
backlash which proceeded the decision dealt with these types of issues. See, e.g.,
Rape Law, supra note 98, at 970-73. This article only purports to address the portion
of the decision which pertained to the implementation of the intrinsic force standard.
This is not to say, however, that the intrinsic force element has not been openly
embraced. One of the goals of the intrinsic force model, to eliminate the compulsion
to resist, has been questioned on several fronts. "Resistance is not sufficient to trig-
ger the use of force because an assailant who encounters resistance may resort to
threats and emotional coercion but not forceful violence." Id. at 972.
Even if this argument is true, it suggests that threats and emotional coercion
somehow put the victim in a more enviable position than being physically attacked.
Whether the rapist accomplished his goal through physical, moral, or emotional
threats or coercion, the act itself is tantamount to forcible compulsion. This assertion
purports to subordinate threats of physical force to the actual exertion of physical
violence as a means of satisfying the element of force; an assertion that the Iniguez
court sharply rejected. People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Cal. 1994).
105. Rape Law, supra note 98, at 971.
106. MAIrrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1778).
107. See Cynthia A. Wickham, Comment, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Con-
duct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399
(1988). Wickham argues that judicial emphasis should be on the force the defendant
exerts rather than the victim's nonconsent. Id. at 400.
108. Id. at 429.
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by its degree of forcefulness."° One of the consequences of this stan-
dard is that it primarily renders the issue of force moot. The focus of the
analysis shifts to the issue of consent.
The insight into rape as an assaultive crime is consistent with our evolving under-
standing of the wrong inherent in forced sexual intimacy .... Any other interpre-
tation of the law, particularly one that defined force in relation to the resistance
or protest of the victim, would directly undermine the goals sought to be achieved
by its reform."'
In State v. Sedia,"' decided one year after MT.S., a Florida Court of
Appeal held that according to the relevant state sexual battery statute,
when there is no consent, the force element is intrinsic to the penetra-
tion."2 Although this sexual battery statute did not explicitly provide
that force is inherent to penetration in the absence of consent,"' the
court reasoned the legislature's subsequent enactment of an interpretive
criminal statute clarified the implementation of the intrinsic force stan-
dard." 4 The court further reasoned the trial court's fact-finding should
be directed toward the issue of whether the victim consented to the in-
tercourse, not whether the defendant exerted the requisite amount of
force.
The state need not prove that the defendant used more physical force than merely
the physical force necessary to accomplish sexual penetration in order to convict
a defendant under section 794.011(5). Therefore, the question of whether [the
defendant's] act occurred as alleged, and without the patient's consent, remains a
question of fact..
Sedia is arguably on more solid ground than M. T.S. because the Flori-
da Legislature clearly implemented an intrinsic force standard and ex-
pressed this intent by enacting a statute which succinctly defines the
parameters of the law.' 6 The ultimate justification, therefore, of an in-
109. Id.
110. State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992).
111. 614 So. 2d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
112. Id. In Sedia, while giving the victim physical therapy treatment, the defendant
allegedly inserted his penis into the victim's vagina from behind. Id. at 534. No force
other than the penetration itself was employed in accomplishing the intercourse. Id.
The victim recoiled from the defendant upon feeling the intercourse. Id.
113. Florida Statute § 794.011(5) states that "[a] person who commits sexual battery
upon a person 12 years of age or older, without that person's consent, and in the
process thereof does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious per-
sonal injury commits a felony of the second degree." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(5)
(West 1994).
114. Florida Statute § 794.005 provides that "the legislature . . . never intended that
the sexual battery offense described in § 794.011(5) require any force or violence
beyond the force and violence that is inherent in the accomplishment of
'penetration.'" FLU STAT. ANN. § 794.005 (West 1994).
115. Sedia, 614 So. 2d at 535 (citation omitted).
116. See id.
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trinsic force standard becomes more defensible when the state legisla-
ture clearly manifests an intent to adopt such a standard rather than
leaving it to the courts to interpret ambiguous legislative signals.
A potential problem with the intrinsic force standard, however, is that
courts may merge the two areas of force and consent, thereby unfairly
prejudicing rape defendants. Given the historic difficulty courts have
encountered in separating the various elements of rape, the intrinsic
force standard could invite even greater judicial error with courts errone-
ously concluding that unauthorized force necessarily intimates that con-
sent was not given."7 Hopefully, courts following the intrinsic force
standard will focus on the element of consent because force is generally
rendered a non-issue in the majority of cases."' Additionally, because
most courts refuse to address or even acknowledge the mens rea ele-
ment of rape,"9 consent would be the only major issue remaining in the
court analysis.
By implementing the intrinsic force standard, the court deftly avoids
the confusing and difficult analysis of what type of force is necessary to
constitute rape. Obviously, physical force presents little problem; it is the
presence of threats, both implied and express, and circumstances con-
tributing to a threatening environment that pose more difficulty to the
trier-of-fact in evaluating the degree of force.2 ' One of the most trou-
bling aspects about force, contributing to judicial inconsistency in inter-
preting a uniform definition, is the linear criteria that courts employ in
establishing the parameters of force. The coercive nuances present in
many sexual encounters may contribute toward or even constitute force.
Yet these multidimensional types of force that are difficult to quantify
and prove will make it difficult for courts to accurately assess whether
the defendant exerted the requisite amount of force to constitute rape.
Thus, the intrinsic force standard avoids this imprecise analysis be-
cause the focus is primarily on the consent issue, rather than the degree
of force. It also recognizes that force is an often elusive concept, difficult
to definitively establish absent physical force or overt threats against the
victim.
117. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 85-117 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
120. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1105. "A second understanding of force, not
acknowledged in the law of rape, recognizes that bodily integrity means more than
freedom from the force of fists, that power can be exercised without violence, and
that coercion is not limited to what boys do in schoolyards." Id.
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IV. THE EXTRINSIC FORCE STANDARD
Courts that have adopted the extrinsic force standard require that the
prosecution prove actual force or the threat of actual force.'21 The de-
gree of force required varies from state to state and is generally a func-
tion of the facts and circumstances of each case. It is clear, however,
that situations in which a victim's capitulation to her attacker is strictly
out of fear of imminent physical injury will not amount to force."2
The most glaring example of the implementation of the extrinsic force
standard is Commonwealth v. Berkowitz.'23 In Berkowitz, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that a woman's repeated declarations of "no"
were insufficient to prove rape absent evidence of "forcible compul-
sion."'24 The victim in Berkowitz entered the, defendant's dormitory
room in search of the defendant's roommate.2 ' After locking the door,
the defendant sat beside the victim and proceeded to lift up her shirt and
121. See Stokes v. State, 648 So. 2d 1179 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (acknowledging
that the prosecution must show physical force or threat of force in order to demon-
strate the forcible compulsion element); State v. Parish, 405 So. 2d 1080 (La. 1981)
(holding that forcible compulsion was not established for attempted rape because the
defendant did not exert sufficient force upon the victim); Commonwealth v.
Gabrielson, 536 A.2d 401, 407 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (quoting Pennsylvania rape statute in
which threats of physical intercourse "where the victim considers it pointless to re-
sist" constitute forcible compulsion), appeal denied, 542 A.2d 1365 (Pa. 1988); State v.
Soderquist, 816 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that the force neces-
sary to constitute rape is not simply the force inherent in the penetration, but the
force used to overcome resistance); State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 535 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1989) (noting that the force exhibited by mere penetration is not itself enough
to constitute force).
122. In State v. Reed, the court reiterated the requirement that the prosecution must
show actual force in order to convict the defendant of rape. "The defendant is cor-
rect in his assertion that to convict him .. . the state had to prove compulsion by
actual as opposed to constructive force." 479 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Me. 1984); see also,
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8) (1994) (defining forcible compulsion as "physical force which
overcomes earnest resistance or a threat ... that places a person in fear of immedi-
ate death' or serious physical injury"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para 12-12(f) (1993)
(requiring the "use of force or violence, including ... threats to use force or vio-
lence on the victim"); L. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41, 14:42.1 (West 1993) (noting that
the prosecution must demonstrate that the "victim was prevented from resisting by
force or the threat of physical violence"). While the Illinois rape statute adopts a
force standard that demands some exertion of force by the defendant beyond the
actual penetration, it omits the resistance requirement that the Louisiana and Alabama
rape statutes include. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-12(0. The Missouri rape statute
has a scheme similar to that of Illinois: "[a] person commits the crime of forcible
rape if he has sexual intercourse . . . without that person's consent by the use of
forcible compulsion." Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.030.1 (1986).
123. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
124. Id. at 1164.
125. Id. at 1163.
1300
[Vol. 23: 1277, 1996] Rape
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
fondle her breasts.2 The defendant penetrated the victim's vagina with
his penis and ejaculated on her stomach.'27 The victim offered no physi-
cal resistance, but testified that she repeatedly stated "no" during the en-
counter.28
The court concluded that the defendant did not commit rape because
the victim failed to show that the defendant used any force or threat of
force to compel her to have intercourse." The court focused on wheth-
er the forcible compulsion element of the rape statute had been met in
order to support a conviction."3 The court emphasized that the victim
need not resist 3 ' and must only demonstrate that the force exerted by
the defendant was "such as to establish lack of consent and to induce
the [victim] to submit without additional resistance."32 The court, how-
ever, reasoned that the prosecution did not demonstrate the forcible
compulsion element to the degree necessary to sustain a rape convic-
tion." The court emphasized the victim's wavering testimony, thereby
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1164.
129. Id. at 1166.
130. Id. at 1163-64. Pennsylvania Statute § 3121 states:
A person commits a felony of the first degree when he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person not one's spouse:
(1) by forcible compulsion;
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a per-
son of reasonable resolution;
(3) who is unconscious; or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such a person is incapable
of consent.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (1983).
131. Berkowitz, 641 Ak2d at 1163.
132. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986)). The
Rhodes court expounded that "[tihe degree of force required to constitute rape . . . is
relative and depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case." 510 A.2d at 1226
(quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 493 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. 1982)).
133. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164. The court looked to Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,
542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988), to support its holding that the victim failed to establish the
forcible compulsion element of rape. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164. In Mlinarich, a
minor repeatedly objected to sexual intercourse with the defendant, but did not at-
tempt any physical resistance. 542 A.2d at 1337. Ultimately the minor voluntarily en-
gaged in intercourse after the defendant's threat to send her to juvenile detention
center. Id. The court held that the forcible compulsion element of rape had not been
met because no physical or psychological coercion was shown to have been exerted
by the defendant. Id. at 1342.
intimating an air of indecisiveness on her part. '" The court focused pri-
marily on the actual degree of physical force exerted by the defendant,
as indicated by the victim's testimony regarding the precise degree of the
shove by which the defendant put her on the bed, and whether the unty-
ing of her sweatpants was the only physical contact made with the de-
fendant. ' The court also looked at the victim's lack of physical resis-
tance when the defendant lifted her shirt and bra.'
36
In addressing the victim's verbal resistance, the court stated that "[a]s
to the complainant's testimony that she stated 'no' throughout the en-
counter with Appellee, we point out that, while such an allegation of fact
would be relevant to the issue of consent, it is not relevant to.the issue
of force."'37 Thus, under such reasoning, the prosecution could not use
the rape victim's verbal protestations to show that the defendant had
forcible intercourse. The court correctly acknowledged that the victim's
protests were obviously relevant to consent."w The victim's subjective
testimony, however, was also relevant to the issue of force. The court, in
refusing to address the victim's negative sentiments regarding the sexual
encounter,"n effectively limited the evidence that it could have consid-
ered in determining whether the defendant exhibited the requisite
amount of force necessary to constitute rape. Notwithstanding its ac-
knowledgement that the issue of force is "'relative and depends on the
facts and particular circumstances of the case,'" '4 the court only con-
sidered evidence of physical resistance on the part of the victim.'4'
Berkowitz is somewhat unusual in that the court not only required the
prosecution to show extrinsic force, but also refused to acknowledge the
relevance of the victim's statements of "no" as to the issue of force.
4 2
134. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164. The court focused on several of the victim's
statements concerning the degree of force used by the defendant in evaluating
whether forcible compulsion existed. Id. For example, the court found the following
statements by the victim to be especially telling: "He put me down on the bed. It
was kind of like-He didn't throw me on the bed. It's hard to explain. It was kind
of like a push but not-I can't explain what I'm trying to say." Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The Berkowitz holding is somewhat of a retreat from the court's past posi-
tion regarding the scope of evidence that may be considered when determining forc-
ible compulsion. In Commonwealth v. Rhodes, the court stated that "the 'force nec-
essary to support convictions for rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
need only be such as to establish lack of consent and to induce the woman to sub-
mit without additional resistance'." 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (emphasis added)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 k2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)).
138. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1163 (quoting Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226 (citation omitted)).
141. Id.
142. Many critics of the Berkowitz decision denounced the fact that the court
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Thus, it seems that Berkowitz goes even further than most extrinsic
force standards because not only does it require some type of actual
force or threat of force, but it also hinders the prosecution by limiting
the evidence it may use to prove that the defendant exerted such force.
One of the most interesting aspects of Berkowitz's application of the
force element is that the court never explicitly states what degree of
force would be required to prove rape beyond a reasonable doubt. A fair
interpretation of the holding leads to the conclusion that extrinsic force
is indeed the standard. The court repeatedly focused only on physical
force, the threat of physical force, and psychological coercion as accept-
able examples of force." The fact that the defendant penetrated the
complainant is uncontroverted, thereby eliminating the possibility of the
application of an intrinsic force standard.'" Further, the court never
considered whether the complainant's fear of physical injury caused her
to surrender without provoking the defendant to exercise actual force,
which weighs heavily against a finding that a fear standard was applied.
Perhaps the best evidence that the court employed an extrinsic force
standard is the fact that the majority of the court's analysis concentrated
exclusively on the physical manifestations of force that the defendant
displayed toward the victim.' "She [the complainant] agreed that
Appellee's hands were not restraining her in any manner during the actu-
al penetration, and that the weight of his body on top of her was the
only force applied. She testified that at no time did Appellee verbally
threaten her."'46
Equally damaging to the prosecution's case, however, was the court's
refusal to address the victim's subjective reactions to the sexual encoun-
ter when considering the issue of force. Such an examination would have
viewed the victim's repeated utterances of "no" as irrelevant to the issue of force.
"The 7-0 ruling by the all-male court, women's rights advocates say, is a crime and
runs counter to advice often given [to] women about what to do if they are at-
tacked." Rape Ruling, supra note 53, at 1. "'What is it about the word "no" they
don't understand?'" Id. (quoting Deborah Zubow, program coordinator for the
Women's International League for Peace & Freedom). Other commentators questioned
the court's emphasis on force, as well as its lack of analysis on the consent issue.
Id. "Usually, the focus is on lack of consent .... Focusing on the force issue is an
aberration peculiar to Pennsylvania." Id.
143. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
144. See id. at 1163-64.
145. Id. In fact, the court's exclusive analysis centered around the physical re-
straints that the defendant allegedly committed against the complainant. Id.
146. Id. at 1164.
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allowed the court to probe more deeply into the mind of the victim in
order to ascertain whether the defendant did or did not exert a sufficient
amount of force in order to constitute rape. Instead, the court looked
strictly at the conduct of the defendant through his perspective in order
to evaluate the degree of force. Such a limited inquiry ignores the other
side of the story. It is possible that the defendant conveyed threats or
shades of force that the victim could not articulate at the time due to
fear. Judicial efficiency may have been better served by evaluating both
the victim's and the defendant's account of the attack in order to accu-
rately determine the degree of force manifested by the defendant.'47
In defense of its refusal to allow the victim's subjective testimony
regarding the sexual encounter, the Berkowitz court cited to its previous
holding in Commonwealth v. Mlinarich,"' wherein the court reversed
the defendant's rape conviction because there was insufficient evidence
to prove the "forcible compulsion" element of the applicable rape stat-
ute. 49 The Berkowitz court concluded that "Mlinarich implicitly dic-
tates that where there is a lack of consent, but no showing of either
physical force, a threat of physical force, or psychological coercion, the
'forcible compulsion' requirement ... is not met." 511
Reaction to Berkowitz was swift. One month after the decision, the
Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Schmidt5 ' explicitly rejected
the reasoning in Berkowitz holding that a victim's statement of "no" is
relevant to the issue of force.'52 The court reasoned that the statement
provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the intercourse
occurred against the victim's will.'
Notwithstanding the fact that some courts require the prosecution to
prove that the defendant exerted extrinsic force, such a standard has
inherent flaws. The most obvious weakness associated with an extrinsic
force standard is that, in many cases, there simply is not enough evi-
dence to show actual force. In such instances, the trial is reduced to
which party does the trier-of-fact find to be a more credible witness.
Women who are familiar enough with the law so as to be aware of the
actual force requirement may be more encouraged to resist in an effort
to provide proof at trial that their will was overcome by the defendant's
147. Critics of the Berkowitz decision were outraged primarily by the fact that the
complainant repeatedly indicated that she did not wish to have sex with the defen-
dant, yet the court refused to find that this constituted nonconsent. See supra note
53 and accompanying text.
148. 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa- 1988).
149. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
150. Id. (footnote omitted).
151. 885 P.2d 312 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
152. Id. at 316.
153. Id.
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force. This is where the logical inconsistency between discouraging vic-
tims from resisting but still requiring that the prosecution show extrinsic
force is most apparent. The paradox rests in the fact that the more the
victim resists, the greater the physical danger to her, but the greater the
chance of convicting the defendant at the subsequent trial.
V. THE FEAR STANDARD
Somewhere between extrinsic and intrinsic force lies the fear standard.
The fear standard allows evidence of the victim's subjective fear of immi-
nent bodily injury to show that the defendant exerted the requisite
amount of force."M The jurisdictions that adopted the fear standard
have wrestled with the contention that rape is a crime of force above
and beyond actual penetration. Yet, they are also aware that such a stan-
dard is often difficult for the prosecution to prove. Much of this realiza-
tion comes in the face of the massive onslaught of legislation, commen-
tary, and public opinion advocating rape reform." A major criticism of
traditional rape analysis has been its emphasis on trying the victim in-
stead of the defendant. Legislatures have responded by reducing the
prosecutor's burden in proving the element of force. To make the ele-
ment of force easier to prove, courts will admit certain types of evidence
that show the victim consented to the rape out of fear of imminent bodi-
154. Most courts and commentators agree that the victim's subjective account and
explanation of her conduct relating to the alleged rape is relevant in ascertaining the
amount of force exerted during the attack. See People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188
(Cal. 1994) (noting that the element of fear contains a subjective element and even if
victim's fear is unreasonable, force may nonetheless be found if the defendant know-
ingly exploits this unreasonable, subjective fear); People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 126
(Cal. 1986) (reasoning that the victim's subjective account of fear of physical violence
was genuine); People v. Bowen, 609 N.E.2d 346, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (reasoning
that the victim's subjective reaction to sexual assault in failing to cry out are factors
to be evaluated in resolving the issue of force), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d 339 (Il.),
and cert. denied, Bowen v. Illinois, 114 S. Ct. 387 (1993); People v. Brown, 495
N.W.2d 812, 814 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the defendant "takes the victim as
he finds her," and that subjective testimony of severe emotional trauma caused by
defendant was determinative in concluding defendants guilty of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct); People v. Cook, 588 N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (N.Y. App. Div.) (analyzing
the victim's subjective beliefs when evaluating forcible compulsion), appeal denied,
610 N.E.2d 396 (N.Y. 1992); State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673, 680 (N.C. 1987) (evalu-
ating the totality of circumstances in considering victim's capitulation to sexual acts
in order to establish forcible compulsion).
155. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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ly injury. 15 For instance, courts will weigh the victim's subjective tes-
timony of the circumstances of the alleged rape against an objective
standard of reasonableness to ensure that the victim's fears were justifi-
able under the circumstances.' 7 The rationale of this standard is most
clearly seen in cases where the victim offers neither physical nor verbal
resistance, but may nonetheless have been raped."
Courts that have adopted this standard recognize that verbal resis-
tance, often, is not offered due to fear of retaliation by the defendant,
indecision, or from sheer paralysis of fear.'" Sometimes the victim is
simply intimidated by the size and strength of the attacker, thus warrant-
ing an objective standard to evaluate whether the victim's fears are justi-
fied so as to provide adequate safeguards for the defendant.'6" The
objective part of this standard is generally gauged by the reasonableness
of the fear in proportion to the circumstances of the sexual encoun-
ter."' One of the earlier cases applying the fear standard was People v.
Barnes. The California Supreme Court examined the totality of the
circumstances, including the victim's subjective perceptions regarding the
encounter, and concluded that the defendant exhibited the requisite force
to support a conviction of rape.'" In Barnes, the victim was waiting for
the defendant to unlock the gate to his house so that she could leave."'
The defendant made several physical gestures toward the victim intimat-
ing that he would physically strike her.' The victim testified that she
felt that the defendant was "psychotic" and pretended to comply with his
advances only in order to prevent him from becoming physically vio-
156. See infra notes 159-93 and accompanying text.
157. See People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Cal. 1994).
158. Id.
159. This point did not go unnoticed by the Iniguez court. Id. at 1187. In holding
that the victim's subjective fear was reasonable under the circumstances, the court
noted that the defendant's intimidating size and state of intoxication would reasonably
cause a man or woman confronting this scenario to react with fear of imminent
bodily injury. Id. at 1188-89.
160. Id. at 1188. Iniguez, however, is not the first instance in which the California
Supreme Court has held that the victim's unreasonable fear of imminent bodily con-
tact may be enough to satisfy the force element if the defendant knowingly takes
advantage of this fear in achieving the sexual intercourse. See People v. Jeff, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 143 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that a victim's "unreasonable fear may suffice
if the accused knowingly takes advantage of this fear in accomplishing sexual inter-
course").
161. See Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1188 ("[Tlhe objective component . . . asks whether
the victim's fear was reasonable under the circumstances.").
162. 721 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1986).
163. Id. at 111.
164. Id. at 112.
165. Id. The defendant grabbed the victim by her sweater, and boasted that he
could "pick her up with one hand and throw her out." Id.
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lent.'" Acquiescing to his threatening physical gestures, the victim en-
gaged in intercourse with the defendant.'67
The court emphasized that the prosecution was not required to show
that the victim offered physical resistance in order to prove rape."6 In
fact, the court took great pains to emphasize that eliminating the resis-
tance requirement has placed rape in the same category as other crimes
that involve force, fear, and nonconsent.'69 These crimes include assault
and robbery, neither of which requires nor even contemplates resis-
tance. 7' One of the Barnes court's major concerns in endorsing the
elimination of the resistance requirement was the inherent risks that the
rape victim assumes in attempting to resist her attacker.'7 ' Earlier opin-
ions, either because they refused to acknowledge the virtual futility and
danger of resistance or were simply out of touch with the realities of
sexual assault, clearly expected rape victims to display the utmost resis-
tance in repelling their attackers."n Barnes is representative of the
modem trend that recognizes the complexities associated with resistance.'73
166. Id. at 111.
167. Id. at 112.
168. Id. at 123. Accompanying the rule that the victim need not offer physical resis-
tance, is the increasing willingness to admit other evidence to show that the defen-
dant exerted force in accomplishing the intercourse. Id. at 120-23. The court may
view "the circumstances of the case, including the presence of verbal and nonverbal
threats, or the kind of force that might reasonably induce fear in the mind of the
victim." Id. at 122.
169. Id. at 120-21.
170. Id. The law does not require a victim of a robbery to show evidence of resis-
tance for the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Although
rape contains elements similar to other crimes against the person, it is somewhat of
an anomaly because the line between lawful intercourse and rape is often difficult to
distinguish. Recent decisions, however, indicate a trend toward recognizing that the
absence of physical resistance offered by the victim should not impact in deciding
whether she was raped. "[Ilt is no longer proper to instruct the jury that it must find
the complainant resisted before it may return a verdict of guilt." Id. at 121.
171. Id.
172. People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (1874). This case is representative of the earlier
line of reasoning that essentially listed resistance as a prerequisite to convicting the
defendant of rape. Under this reasoning, the resistance standard would make the is-
sue of whether the intercourse was lawful relatively clear, because the absence of
resistance generally led to a finding that the woman consented to the intercourse.
"Can the mind conceive of a woman . . . revoltingly unwilling that this deed should
be done upon her, who would not resist so hard and so long as she was able?" Id.
at 384; see also People v. Bales, 169 P.2d 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (holding that ab-
sent some showing of resistance by the victim a rape conviction could not be up-
held).
173. Barnes, 721 P.2d at 119. The traditional line of cases reflected society's view
1307
Having confirmed that resistance is no longer a requirement necessary
to prove rape,74 the Barnes court turned its attention to the requisite
proof that the prosecution must offer in the absence of any resistance by
the victim.'75 The court identified a wide array of evidence' 6 that the
prosecution may employ to convict a defendant, including the use of
verbal and nonverbal threats and force that could instill fear in the
victim's mind."'7
The Barnes court implicitly acknowledged the relevance of the subjec-
tive fear of the victim of physical injury, even in the absence of any overt
physical manifestation of a threat by the defendant.'78 This point is
somewhat overshadowed by the fact that the defendant clearly demon-
strated physical force by threatening the victim with his superior physical
power, telling anecdotes about past sexual exploits where he forced
other women to submit to intercourse, conveying the message of the
futility of resistance, and keeping the door closed when the victim at-
tempted to exit the room. 9 Given the foregoing, there was sufficient
evidence to show that the defendant used force and threats in obtaining
the victim's acquiescence to intercourse, so her subjective fear of physi-
cal injury was hardly crucial to the jury's finding of guilt.'" By recog-
nizing, the validity of the victim's subjective fear of physical injury as a
viable indicator of the force exerted by the defendant, however, Barnes
set the stage for the formal endorsement of this fear in the absence of
any physical or verbal resistance by the victim.
The fear standard was explicitly endorsed by the California Supreme
Court in People v. Iniguez,8' which reversed a court of appeal's finding
there was insufficient evidence of force or fear of imminent bodily injury
to sustain the defendant's conviction of rape. In Iniguez, the defen-
of rapists and rape victims. "Real" rape victims were traditionally expected to attempt
physical resistance. See Moss v. State, 45 So. 2d 125, 126 (Miss. 1950) ("A mere tacti-
cal surrender is not enough. Where the penalty of the defendant may be supreme, so
must resistance be unto the uttermost [sic]."); People v. Carey, 119 N.E. 83 (N.Y.
1918) (holding that there can be no rape unless the woman offers complete resis-
tance).
174. It should be noted that California Penal Code § 261 was amended in 1980
when the resistance requirement was deleted, but Barnes was one of the first cases
to chronicle the demise of the resistance element in detail. Barnes, 721 P.2d at 113-
21.
175. Id. at 121.
176. Id. at 122.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 122-23.
180. Id.
181. 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994).
182. Id. at 1184.
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dant approached the victim while she was sleeping, pulled down her
pants, fondled her buttocks, and inserted his penis inside her vagina.'
The victim testified that she did not resist or try to escape from the de-
fendant.'"
The court concentrated its analysis in evaluating the nexus between
force and fear to the relevant rape statute.'" The court prefaced its
analysis by noting that the current statute allows for a finding of rape by
"force, violence, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the
person or another."" The court noted "the element of fear of immedi-
ate and unlawful bodily injury has two components, one subjective and
one objective."'87 The subjective element focuses on whether the victim
allowed the defendant to have intercourse with her because she feared
immediate and unlawful bodily injury.'8" The objective component asks
whether the subjective fear was reasonable or if the defendant exploited
the victim's subjective fear, even if such fear was unreasonable under the
circumstances. "
The court concluded that the victim satisfied both the subjective and
objective criteria of fear of immediate bodily injury.' First, the victim
183. Id. at 1185.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1186-90. Section 261 of the California Penal Code states that rape occurs
"[wihere it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, or
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of another." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261(a)(2) (West 1988). Before 1980, § 261 defined rape as "an act of sexual
intercourse under circumstances where the person resists, but where 'resistance is
overcome by force or violence' or where a person is prevented from resisting by
threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of exe-
cution." Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1186 (quoting People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110 (Cal.
1986)). Under this statute, the victim had to show resistance, or that resistance was
thwarted due to threats by the defendant. Barnes, 721 P.2d at 115. This requirement
placed an extra burden on the victim because in instances where no resistance was
offered, the victim would have to demonstrate exactly why she did not attempt to
repel the rapist. Id. The old statute was amended in 1980 to reflect the elimination
of the resistance requirement. Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1187.
186. Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1187.
187. Id. at 1188.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1188-89. There was substantial disagreement as to the degree of subjec-
tivity involved in the test outlined by the Iniguez court. As Iniguez's attorney ex-
pounded: "It seems to me that any non-consensual act of penetration is now
rape ... even though the Legislature did not say that. By the (California) Supreme
Court's decision, as long as it includes elements of fear, it is rape." Maura Dolan,
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froze out of fear of the defendant committing an act of violence against
her. 9 ' The court specifically rejected the contention that the subjective
component was not met because the victim failed to verbalize her fear of
the defendant. The court reasoned that "[flear may be inferred from the
circumstances despite even superficially contrary testimony of the vic-
tim." 2 Second, the objective element of the fear requirement was met
when the victim was awakened by the defendant's movement, fondling,
and touching, all of which would reasonably cause an individual to react
in fear. '
A. Interplay Between the Extrinsic Force and Fear Standards
Recently, many courts have expressed a great deal of reluctance to-
ward abandoning the extrinsic force standard. Perhaps the greatest ex-
ample of the judicial wavering on how much force is required to show
rape is seen in a recent line of North Carolina cases that have addressed
several degrees of force.
In State v. Alston," the defendant and the complainant had main-
tained a consensual, yet stormy, sexual relationship.'95 The peculiarity
of their relationship was underscored by the fact that the woman would
remain entirely motionless while the defendant undressed her and en-
gaged in intercourse with her." The incident in question occurred
when, after threatening to "fix" the complainant's face, the defendant led
the complainant from school to a friend's home while discussing the sta-
tus of their relationship. 7 When they arrived there, the defendant dis-
robed the complainant and ordered her to lie on the bed.9 The defen-
dant pushed apart the woman's legs and engaged in intercourse with
Assault Without Struggle Can Be Rape, Court Says, LA. TIMES, May 24, 1994, at A2.
While this statement must be evaluated in light of the speaker's bias, it does raise
the issue that the objective test of the fear standard may potentially be overshad-
owed by the subjective testimony of the victim regarding her fear of imminent bodily
contact.
191. Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1188.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).
195. Id. at 471.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 472. The complainant told the defendant their relationship was over. Id.
Defendant then replied that he had "a right to make love to her again," but the com-
plainant did not respond to his remark. Id.
198. Id.
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her." The complainant cried during the sexual encounter, but did not
physically resist.2"
The court held that no rape had been committed because the defen-
dant did not exhibit the requisite amount of force.2"' The court rea-
soned that the complainant's fear emanated from the general circum-
stances of the defendant's comment to her that he would "fix" her face
and from his act of grabbing her arm at the school, but not from the
sexual encounter itself.2" Thus, "absent evidence that the- defendant
used force or threats to overcome the will of the victim to resist the
sexual intercourse alleged to have been rape, such general fear was not
sufficient to show that the defendant used the force required to support
a conviction of rape."2" The court was influenced by the fact that the
complainant and the victim had previously engaged in a consensual sexu-
al relationship prior to the incident in question.2" It seems, therefore,
that the existence of a consensual relationship between defendant and
complainant presumes that the intercourse was not forcibly accom-
plished through fear."0 This perplexing leap of logic has not gone unno-
ticed by other courts.
Three years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court revisited Alston
in State v. Ethridge,2" where the defendant was accused of raping his
son. The defendant ordered his son to remove his clothes, and the child
initially refused, but submitted after his father repeated the request.2"7
After intercourse, the defendant threatened to harm the child if he told
anybody about the encounter.2"
The defendant argued that the Alston "general fear" rationale should
control because there was no manifestation of threats or force during
intercourse.2" The court refused to apply Alston, however, because the
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 476.
202. Id.
203. Id. (italics omitted).
204. Id. at 475.
205. Id.
206. 352 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. 1987).
207. Id. at 675.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 681. The contention that the parent did not exercise the requisite
amount of force in alleged intercourse with his child has been argued in many child
rape cases. Usually, courts have reached similar conclusions as in Etheridge. See
State v. Eskridge, 526 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ohio 1988) (holding that father raped his
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inherent dominance the defendant had over the victim in light of the fa-
ther-son relationship created the necessary force required to show
rape."' The court similarly limited Alston "to its peculiar facts" because
the inherent degree of force is different in the case of incestuous inter-
course than in consensual sexual activity between adults.2 '
Thus, the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted a dual standard re-
garding the force requirement. Alston stands for the proposition that
"general fear" from circumstances surrounding, but not directly related to
the intercourse in question, is not sufficient to demonstrate force.212
This implicitly applies to cases where the parties have maintained a prior
consensual relationship."3 The court, however, made clear that the gen-
eral fear requirement is inapplicable in cases involving intrafamilial sexu-
al intercourse.2"4 In such instances, fear may be adduced from the su-
perimposing presence of the parental figure.2"5 Therefore, the subjective
fear of the child is relevant to help prove the force element of rape.
daughter because the coercion implicit in parental authority is almost always enough
to show force). But see Commonwealth v. Biggs, 467 A.2d 31, 32 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1983) (holding that the parental relationship did not establish the force element nec-
essary to prove rape).
210. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d at 681. "The youth and vulnerability of children, coupled
with the power inherent in a parent's position of authority, creates a unique situation
of dominance and control in which explicit threats and displays of force are not
necessary to effect the abuser's purpose." Id.
211. The court explicitly overruled State v. Lester, 321 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984), affd, 330 S.E.2d 205 (N.C. 1985), which was factually similar to Etheridge, be-
cause the "general fear" rationale is misapplied in cases of adults engaging in inter-
course with a child.
212. State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (N.C. 1984).
213. The Etheridge court stated as much by reasoning that "[slexual activity be-
tween a parent and a minor child is not comparable to sexual activity between two
adults with a history of consensual intercourse." 352 S.E.2d at 681.
214. See id. Courts applying the extrinsic force standard would conclude differently.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Biggs, the court held that a father's intercourse
with his daughter was not rape because there was no proof of adequate force. 467
A.2d 31, 32 (Pa. Super. Ct 1983). The father instructed his daughter to engage in
intercourse with him because, "if the mother could no longer provide as a mother, it
was up to the oldest daughter." Id. The court held that because the father did not
accomplish intercourse by force or threats, there was no rape. Id. "The record clearly
shows that defendant never used or threatened to use force in inducing his daughter
to participate in sexual intercourse. Although this conduct is reprehensible it is not
the conduct which [the rape statute] forbids . . . ." Id. This is clearly against the
rationale in Etheridge, which emphasized that the very nature of the parent-child rela-
tionship was enough to show force. 352 S.E.2d at 681. Biggs is representative of the
fact that some states do not recognize a dual standard regarding force, but rather
require the extrinsic force standard in all rape cases.
215. As the court reasoned, "In such cases the parent wields authority as another
assailant might wield a weapon. The authority itself intimidates; the implicit threat to
exercise it coerces." Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d at 682.
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While the court refused to overrule Alston, it clearly distanced itself from
the reasoning and holding of that case."'
Although the extrinsic force standard seems to remain in cases where
adults have maintained a consensual relationship, its holding has been
cast in doubt. It is difficult to say what the Etheridge court meant when
it limited the Alston holding "to its peculiar facts."2"7 The peculiarity of
Alston may very well occur in the uncommon scenario where the prose-
cution cannot establish that the victim's fear of imminent bodily contact
stems from the intercourse itself, but from prior events unrelated to the
sexual encounter. Later cases addressing Alston seem to support this
position.2"8 Indeed, such cases have even hinted that actual penetration
itself"' may well constitute the requisite amount of force necessary to
constitute rapeY°0
VI. CONCLUSION
M. T.S., Berkowitz, and Iniguez clearly represent unique interpretations
of the force element. Upon close examination, however, each standard
216. Id. at 681.
217. Id.
218. State v. Brown, 420 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. 1992). The Brown court rejected the
defendant's reliance upon Alston by stating that the "general fear" rationale should
only apply in cases identical to the peculiar facts of Alston. Id. at 150. "Alston arose
upon evidence so peculiar that the decision may well be sul generis." Id. The an-
noyed tone that the supreme court seems to adopt every time a defendant invariably
cites Alston for the erroneous proposition that "general fear" rationale is universally
applicable to all rape cases, is indicative of the court's uneasiness about the case.
219. One justice on the Brown court argued that the nature of the defendant's at-
tack lent itself to a finding that force was implied in the act of penetration.. Id. at
154 (Frye, J., concurring). Justice Frye commented that when the victim is unaware
of what is happening, the court should imply that the force and lack of consent
elements are satisfied in order to prevent rape defendants from successfully arguing
that no force was actually exercised during the intercourse. Id. (Frye, J., concurring).
Justice Frye argued that this "surprise attack" is analogous to raping a victim while
she sleeps or is unconscious. Id. (Frye, J., concurring). Obviously, the court's stan-
dard of force is extrinsic because the fact that penetration occurred is uncontrovert-
ed. Id. (Frye, J., concurring). This problem would not arise in states applying an
intrinsic standard of force because the penetration was not at issue.
220. Id. at 150. The court left open the question of whether intrinsic force would
be sufficient. Id. The court declined to decide whether the actual physical force
would establish the force element in the sexual act at issue. Id. The fact that the
supreme court would even consider the intrinsic force standard so soon after Alston
communicates that views are certainly changing.
1313
focuses attention in different areas. Extrinsic force concentrates on the
conduct of the defendant by focusing almost exclusively on the amount
of force or threat of force used by the defendant to commit rape. This
standard makes it more difficult for the prosecution to prove rape be-
cause it must prove force in addition to nonconsent. This standard artifi-
cially separates rape from other types of assault-related crimes by requir-
ing a more stringent prima facie case for the prosecution to prove. Fur-
thermore, the extrinsic force standard places the victim at greater risk
because it encourages resistance to provide evidence of force.22" '
The fear standard is somewhat of a hybrid between intrinsic and ex-
trinsic force. Courts in this category are reluctant to go so far as to say
that force is intrinsic to the act of intercourse, yet are simultaneously
uncomfortable with allowing force to play such a big part in rape analy-
sis. Thus, the focus is on both the victim and the defendant in adjudicat-
ing the basis of her fears measured against the severity of the
defendant's attack. While this represents a departure from the extrinsic
force standard, it fails to place the crime of rape on par with other as-
saultive crimes because it requires that the defendant exert a specified
degree of force to be found guilty of rape. As such, this standard suffers
from the same inconsistencies as does the extrinsic force standard. It
does, however, allow the prosecution a wider array of evidence that it
may offer as proof of force.
Intrinsic force is the easiest force standard for the prosecution to
prove. The only obligation incumbent on the prosection regarding force
is to show that intercourse actually occurred. Most rape prosecutions
rise and fall on the issue of consent; the actual penetration is seldom at
issue. Thus, the intrinsic force standard is the most logical point of anal-
ysis from which courts may address the issue of force because it focuses
on the assaultive act of the defendant. Intrinsic force analogizes the force
of rape to the force of assault, battery, and other crimes against the per-
son where the actual degree of force is irrelevant to whether or not the
defendant committed the crime. Thus, the brunt of the court's analysis is
centered on whether the victim consented to the intercourse. Instead of
focusing overwhelmingly on the conduct of the victim, which occurs
under the extrinsic force standard, the intrinsic force model looks to-
ward the actions of the defendant to establish the force element while
concentrating on the victim to ascertain nonconsent. This dual focus on
both the defendant and victim alleviates excessive, as well as exclusive,
judicial scrutiny on the victim. Under this standard, rape is analyzed in a
221. See Estrich, supra note 13, at 1094. Estrich notes this point in endeavoring to
define rape. "We ask: What did the defendant do? What did he know or intend when
he did it? [C]ourts, in defining the crime, have focused almost incidentally on the de-
fendant-and almost entirely on the victim." Id.
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manner analogous to other similar assaultive crimes thereby deferring to
the rape victim the same protection as other victims of violent crimes.
JOSHUA MARK FRIED
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